Zealous Advocates: The historical foundations of the adversarial criminal defence lawyer by Smith, Thomas
Law, Crime and History (2012) 1 
1 
 
 
ZEALOUS ADVOCATES: THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS  
OF THE ADVERSARIAL CRIMINAL DEFENCE LAWYER 
Tom Smith1 
 
Abstract 
The place of the criminal defence lawyer in the modern criminal justice system is a given; every 
suspect and defendant expects full representation as a right. However, the defence lawyer 
appeared surprisingly late in the long and venerable history of the English and Welsh legal 
system. Notwithstanding the defence lawyer‟s role as advocate for the accused, this unique 
professional role involves a variety of duties and obligations. This article will focus on the 
historical development of these core „principles‟ of criminal defence as well as the expansion of 
the role in the general context of adversarialism. 
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Introduction 
The criminal defence lawyer is a familiar figure in the modern criminal justice system, 
considered an essential component in any fair trial.2 Equally, the adversarial system of justice – 
based on the ideology of „battle‟ between two opposing versions of the facts – is archetypically 
represented by the English and Welsh legal system. Both are, in essence, a „given‟ in the 
modern landscape of criminal justice in this jurisdiction. It might therefore surprise many to 
discover that both developed, by and large, simultaneously, at a late stage in the history of the 
English legal system. The evolution of the adversarial system has been covered widely and in 
depth, most notably by John Langbein;3 however, a specific and overarching examination of the 
historical development of the criminal defence lawyer is lacking from the body of literature on 
this subject. Although this article cannot hope to comprehensively tackle such a substantial 
topic, it will endeavour to contribute in a more focused way.   
 
As a unique legal professional, the work of the criminal defence lawyer requires him or her to 
wear a number of „hats‟. Primarily, the defence lawyer is the advocate and representative of the 
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client, protector of his or her interests, keeper of his confidences and non-judgmental legal 
„friend‟. Alongside the „client hat‟, the defence lawyer must don the „court hat‟; he or she is an 
officer of the court and required to cooperate with and aid in the administration of justice. Third – 
and perhaps more tenuously – the criminal defence lawyer (who is almost always paid using 
publicly funded, legal aid money through the Legal Services Commission in England and Wales) 
can be considered a public servant. The ultimate goal of the criminal justice system is to serve 
society, and as a professional engaged in the determination of criminal justice, the defence 
lawyer must arguably wear a „public hat‟. All of these major functions are underpinned by a 
variety of specific duties and obligations, which have been debated and discussed by 
academics, lawyers, politicians and philosophers for centuries. In my doctoral thesis,4 I argued 
that these could be summarised in a conceptual framework entitled the „zealous advocate‟ 
model. The model outlines and describes the normative duties which define the role of the 
adversarial criminal role. These are summarised below. 
 
1 The ‘Zealous Advocate’ Model 
The duties which fall under the „client hat‟ are the principles of partisanship, detachment and 
confidentiality. Partisanship is arguably the cornerstone of adversarial justice, exemplifying the 
combative philosophy that underscores accusatorial systems. The defence lawyer must act as a 
loyal partisan for the accused; the lawyer‟s „raison d‟être‟ is to serve client interests.5 This loyalty 
requires that the advocate present „as persuasively as he can, the facts and the law of the case 
as seen from the standpoint of his client‟s interest‟6 and „say all that the client would say for 
himself (were he able to do so).‟7Partisanship is commonly associated with a fearless approach 
to the defence of the accused in hostile circumstances; as such, the defence lawyer is required 
to act „with courage and devotion‟ in representing the client;8 the lawyer will frequently be 
required to be „brave, strong and unflinchingly confrontational.‟9 The principle of detachment 
requires a lawyer to provide a service regardless of their personal opinions about the character 
of a client or the „moral status of his objectives‟.10 A fine example of this is the „cab-rank rule‟; in 
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England and Wales, barristers, who represent criminal clients in the most serious cases, must 
accept any client (regardless of their character or the alleged offence) who requires their 
services and conduct a full defence notwithstanding that it may upset, offend or annoy.11 The 
defence lawyer is required to separate the professional and personal, and must „momentarily 
“suspend”… personal morality and make a firm commitment to the system of justice.‟12 As such, 
detachment creates a moral non-accountability which „insulates lawyers from considerations of 
morality, justice or politics in relation to [client] ends or the best means to them.‟13 Confidentiality 
is self-explanatory – the defence lawyer must „hold in strictest confidence the disclosures made 
by the client in the course of the professional relationship.‟14 The „duty of loyalty demand[s] 
confidentiality and the duty of confidentiality demand[s] loyalty‟;15 it is a fundamental part of the 
lawyer-client relationship, but is not absolute, for example in the case of iniquity. 
 
The „court hat‟ which must also be worn by the defence lawyer is underpinned by the principles 
of procedural justice and truth-seeking as espoused by Lord Morris in Rondel v Worsley:16 
The advocate has a duty to assist in ensuring that the administration of justice is not 
distorted or thwarted by dishonest or disreputable practices. To a certain extent every 
advocate is an 'amicus curiae'.17 
 
The defence lawyer is indeed an amicus curiae, or „friend of the court‟; to what extent that 
friendship stretches is debatable. At its root though, procedural justice requires that every 
criminal defence lawyer facilitate the „administration of justice… [and] represent clients by fair 
and proper means.‟18 The defence lawyer should respect the procedural requirements of the 
system, and refrain from tactics that deliberately and unfairly obfuscate or frustrate the pursuit of 
justice. The meaning of truth-seeking is, again, plain; the defence lawyer „must never suppress 
or distort the truth‟,19 which of course prohibits lying for the client or knowingly allowing the client 
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to lie to the court. The defence advocate therefore has „a primary duty to preserve the integrity 
of the adversarial system by preventing the court or jury from being misled by the presentation 
of false or perjured testimony.‟20 
 
The „public hat‟, arguably the least robust aspect of the defence lawyer‟s role, infers an 
obligation which can be termed the principle of morality. The principle suggests that the defence 
lawyer must act „with concern for his own standards as a human person, as well as with regard 
for the requirements of the society which the system serves.‟21 Morality is justified by the 
criminal defence lawyer‟s position as a servant of the public through the legal system and that 
one of the aims of that system is to protect the public and its values. As such, „lawyers should 
try to act in all of their professional dealings as a good person should act‟,22 and avoid 
„“degrad[ing]” themselves personally for the purpose of winning their client‟s case‟.23 As 
mentioned above, the place of morality in the role of the criminal defence lawyer is 
questionable; however, it is for this reason that it has generated so much debate over the last 
200 years (as will be examined below). As such, it deserves at least a speculative place in any 
conceptual consideration of the role. 
 
The duties and obligations outlined in the „zealous advocate‟ model can be traced back beyond 
modern practice, current regulation and academic commentary. They have long-standing, 
historic roots which emerged hundreds of years ago, and have been developed not only in key 
statutes and case law, but in a body of literature created by academics, philosophers and legal 
practitioners. Examining all of the sources which first established the principles that are today 
regarded as vital to the effectiveness of criminal defence is a valuable exercise. Such 
understanding helps us to appreciate the influence the emergence of the criminal defence 
lawyer has had on core elements of fair trial and also enables us to identify the significance of 
modern changes to the nature of the role. This article will explore some of the key examples of 
the development of these central duties and obligations, highlighting their importance and 
continued relevance today. 
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2 The Entrenchment of Adversarialism 
The English and Welsh legal system represents the oldest archetypal adversarial model; as 
such, one tends to think of adversarialism first and the defence lawyer second, assuming that 
the latter was a necessary development resulting from the former. However, it is undoubtedly 
the case that the emergence of both adversarialism and the defence lawyer in English and 
Welsh criminal justice were, effectively, simultaneous and inextricably linked. The birth and 
eventual entrenchment of adversarial culture and the criminal defence lawyer can arguably be 
explained by two broad factors – the professionalization of criminal justice, and the seismic shift 
in political and social ideology that occurred during the Enlightenment. In the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries wholesale change swept through the Western world; the French and 
American Revolutions and the Glorious Revolution in Britain resulted from the unquenchable 
desire of the educated and the down-trodden to see the values of democracy and individual 
liberty realised. The English and Welsh criminal justice system could not remain unaffected by 
the sea-change surrounding it. The seeds of principles such as equality of arms and due 
process were sewn in the late 1600s and early 1700s – rooted in the Enlightenment ideals of 
individual rights and the accountability of the powers that be. 
 
The abuse of power by authorities at the expense of fairness and justice was typified by the 
Treason Trials of the late seventeenth century. Prior to this, the criminal trial was regarded as an 
„altercation‟ between citizens, as famously described by Sir Thomas Smith.24 Equality and 
fairness were assumed because it was simply a case of one member of the public versus 
another, with the Bench providing protection for both. At this point representation by defence 
counsel „was still forbidden...[and] prosecution counsel was virtually never employed.‟25 
However, the Treason Trials clearly demonstrated that the fairness of the „altercation‟ model 
could no longer be taken for granted. Not only were prosecution counsel routinely employed by 
the Crown, judges abandoned their supposed impartiality, favouring the accusers, ignoring 
blatant perjury and barring the defendant from any sort of legal representation.26 The series of 
miscarriages of justice that inevitably resulted highlighted the flaws in the system. This was 
partially remedied by the Treason Trials Act 1696, which allowed the accused, under s1, „to 
make his full Defense, by Counsel learned in the law‟ – but in treason trials only. This was a 
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significant rejection of the rationale that defence counsel „would interfere with the court‟s ability 
to have the accused serve as an informational resource‟,27 but more importantly symbolised the 
dawn of an adversarial system built around equality and due process, which could protect the 
individual from the almighty power of the state. The desire to secure these values only gained 
momentum over the next two centuries, helping to entrench adversarial culture in the English 
and Welsh criminal justice system. 
 
Alongside the philosophical revolution embracing criminal justice was an equally significant 
change in its participants. As Langbein states, „the lawyer-conducted criminal trial appeared late 
in English legal history, and quite rapidly‟.28 until the Treason Trials Act, lawyers rarely had a 
place in the criminal process. Indeed, the whole system lacked a professional structure, with no 
specified, formal body (such as the contemporary Crown Prosecution Service (CPS)) taking 
responsibility for leading prosecutions and no official state police force. In the early eighteenth 
century, this began to change. Barristers appeared more frequently in criminal trials from the 
1720s onwards,29 whilst solicitors – who formally had little or no place in the sphere of criminal 
law – began to act as evidence gatherers and investigation managers in the pre-trial phase. In 
both cases, the prosecution were the primary beneficiaries; this led to a reaction by judges, 
recognising the inequality and unfairness of denying the defence a representative in court whilst 
the prosecution‟s clout grew. By the 1730s, judges had begun to abandon the long-standing 
prohibition on defence counsel for those charged with felonies, despite there being no formal 
allowance for this in legislation.30 As a result, the balance of power in the criminal process 
gradually transferred from the Bench – as investigator and counsel for citizens – to an 
adversarial battle between counsel for the prosecution and defence, reinforced by the influence 
of solicitors who „instructed‟ counsel on behalf of the parties. 
 
„Lawyerization‟ was accompanied by other professional developments which underline the 
increasingly adversarial nature of the criminal justice process in the eighteenth century, and in 
fact accelerated the rise of the lawyer as lead actor. The dwindling role of the individual citizen 
in pursuing criminal prosecutions in the 1800s can generally be attributed to cost, time-
consumption and lack of skill; in contrast, the emergence of the criminal solicitor was arguably 
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driven by these factors.31 As such, various authorities and bodies began to fund and promote 
prosecutions. Most notable was the King, who sporadically paid for and sent lawyers to conduct 
prosecutions during the eighteenth century.32 However, more significant were Associations for 
the Prosecution of Felons and the prosecution „reward‟ scheme. The former involved groups of 
citizens (often led by a solicitor) banding together to pool resources to pay for prosecutions; this 
sort of embryonic, community-led version of the CPS was eventually displaced by the formal 
police force formed in the nineteenth century.33 
 
The „reward‟ system offered members of the public financial compensation for bringing 
offenders to justice, leading to the emergence of professional „thief-takers‟. These disreputable 
characters would often target the vulnerable, fabricate offences, bring a prosecution and reap 
the rewards of a wrongful conviction. Both the Associations and the „reward‟ scheme indicate an 
increasingly adversarial process, with semi-formal systems of prosecution that would evolve into 
the structures we recognise today. The dangers of an unchecked and corrupt system of 
prosecution did not go unrecognised by the courts. The introduction of defence lawyers in the 
1730s was a policy designed to „correct the imbalance that had opened between the unaided 
accused and a criminal prosecution that increasingly reflected the hand of lawyers and quasi-
professional thief-takers.‟34 Described by Langbein as „epochal‟, the introduction of defence 
counsel and the subsequent growth in their use „perpetuated and entrenched the principle that 
the trial court would shoulder no responsibility to investigate on its own‟.35 The judges had 
effectively abdicated their role as the chief criminal investigator and defender; the era of lawyer-
led criminal process had arrived and adversarialism was established as the primary mode of 
criminal justice. 
 
Early Years and Pioneers 
Despite the fact defence lawyers did not begin to regularly appear in criminal proceedings until 
the mid-1800s, some of the founding duties of defence lawyers – embodied in the „zealous 
advocate‟ model outlined above – were openly discussed prior to this. In 1648, Law 
Commissioner Whitelock stated that the duties of an advocate „consist in three things; secrecy, 
diligence and fidelity.‟ He further elaborated, describing „secrecy‟ as a duty to act as someone to 
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whom a client could „lay open his evidences, and the naked truth of his case‟, „diligence‟ as the 
requirement to give „a constant and careful attendance and endeavour in his clients‟ causes‟, 
and „fidelity‟ as a duty to act as someone „the client trusts with his livelihood‟.36 This early, 
definitive statement laid the foundations for the normative conceptions of the role of defence 
counsel which would blossom over the next 200 years. The decision to allow those charged with 
treason to have „partisan helpers‟ in 1696 was a turning point,37 but nearly another century 
passed before the true extent of this change became clear. By the late eighteenth century, the 
approach of defence lawyers had become aggressively partisan and „[this] growing intensity of 
counsel‟s activity bespoke a changed ethos of defensive representation.‟38 
 
Such shifts saw the emergence of conflict between the duty of fidelity to the client and the „view 
of advocacy in which fidelity to the truth should have placed bounds upon counsel‟s service to 
the client.‟39 The rise of the partisan defender was best exemplified by William Garrow, 
described as „one of the finest criminal lawyers of the day‟40 and admirably portrayed in the BBC 
TV series Garrow’s Law. Garrow spent 10 years at the Old Bailey in the 1780s, establishing a 
notorious reputation, „especially as a defense counsel.‟41 Garrow was „the archetype of the 
contentious advocate, zealous on his client's behalf and merciless to his opponents‟,42 adopting 
an approach to criminal defence which „helped to establish a new tone, a new intention, in the 
defense of prisoners in the criminal courts in this period.‟43 Garrow would defend a prisoner „with 
impressive zeal and vigor‟,44 and rarely hesitated in using „brutal and nasty tactics to advance a 
client's cause.‟45 On occasion Garrow would recognise that he owed duties not only to the client 
but to the court, accepting in one case that „he had acted “with improper zeal on the part of my 
client” but he had intended no disrespect to the “great and brave and venerable and learned 
judges of the law of England”‟.46 Garrow‟s legacy was his single-minded and unyielding defence 
of those accused of criminal offences, which represented „the clearest demonstration that 
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adversarial attitudes and methods had come to dominate the courtroom.‟47 
 
Within 30 years, the burgeoning criminal defence profession had perhaps its most definitive, if 
controversial, philosophy espoused by one of its leading lights, Henry Brougham: 
 
An advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, and that 
person is his client. To save that client by all means and expedients, and at all hazards 
and costs to other persons, and, amongst them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and 
in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which 
he may bring upon others. Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an advocate, he 
must go on reckless of the consequences, though it should be his unhappy fate to 
involve his country in confusion.48 
 
Brougham‟s now renowned words are widely regarded as the „classic articulation‟49 of defence 
advocacy, and permeate all modern descriptions of the classic role of the criminal defence 
lawyer. Brougham was entrusted with the defence of Queen Caroline, the estranged wife of 
George IV. On ascending to the throne in 1820, the King sought to have Caroline stripped of her 
title by introducing the Bill of Pains and Penalties in the House of Lords; the ensuing debate in 
the House is popularly referred to as „the Trial of Queen Caroline'.50 Brougham, acting as 
counsel for the Queen, conducted her defence against accusations of adultery. 
 
The Brougham Debate 
The above statement „has stood as the ideal of zealous representation for English and American 
lawyers for almost two centuries since then‟ and has undoubtedly coloured all subsequent 
academic discourse, case law, legislation and regulation relating to criminal defence.51 For 
example, in Queen v O’Connell,52 defence counsel were described as being obliged to exercise 
zeal as „warm as [their] heart‟s blood‟,53 whilst in Kennedy v Broun,54 they were described as 
being bound to „exert every faculty and privilege and power in order that [they] may maintain 
[their] client‟s right.‟55 
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The philosophy has attracted criticism as well as praise. Patterson described it as having done 
„more to corrupt the concept of the lawyer‟s duty to the client than any other single comment‟,56 
while Dos Passos believed that „the great name of Lord Brougham is still used… to sustain 
many ridiculous and false positions of advocates.‟57 Field described it as „unsound in theory and 
pernicious in practice‟ and concluded that „a more revolting doctrine scarcely ever fell from any 
man's lips.‟58 Savage questioned the single-minded nature of Brougham‟s philosophy in less 
dramatic fashion, claiming that „[the] viewpoint, with the greatest respect, cannot be accepted in 
its entirety without any reservation or delimitation‟ – an important reference to the competing 
(and thus limiting) obligations owed by defence lawyers.59 Gold suggested that Brougham‟s 
philosophy was „not in the mainstream of English thinking even in 1846.‟60 Interestingly, around 
that time, the Courvoisier case generated much controversy. Although the „mainstream‟ – 
perhaps meaning the public – reacted negatively to the single-minded and uncompromising 
nature of the defence in that case, it was in fact the trial judge who required such conduct. As 
such, Gold‟s conclusion is questionable if one interprets the „mainstream‟ as being the „legal 
mainstream‟ rather than society in general; one would think the „legal mainstream‟ was perhaps 
a more important barometer in this context. The Courvoisier case will be discussed later in this 
article.  
 
In 1859, Brougham himself described his famous speech as „anything rather than a deliberate 
and well-considered opinion‟ and as „a menace, addressed chiefly to George IV.‟61 Some 
theorists have interpreted this as a retraction of the ethic of partisanship, arguing that it „surely 
sounds like a repudiation, not an endorsement.‟62 
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In contrast, Freedman argued: 
 
The fact that Brougham‟s statement had been delivered as a “menace” was precisely 
what made it so powerful and, at the same time, demonstrated just how far a lawyer 
should be prepared to go on behalf of the client.63 
 
Brougham later restated his philosophy in his autobiography with slightly different, but highly 
significant, wording. He seemingly retracted the claim that protection of the client was „his first 
and only duty (emphasis added)‟, replacing it with the phrase, „the highest and most 
unquestioned of his duties.‟64 This telling departure seemed to be a fairly unambiguous signal 
that Brougham regarded the role of the criminal defence lawyer as comprising several duties – 
not, as has been suggested many times, singular fealty to the client. 
 
The Prisoners’ Counsel Act 1836 
Despite the appearance of criminal defence lawyers in felony trials from the 1730s onwards and 
the development of a discernible doctrine surrounding the role, it took Parliament a century to 
formalise the full representation of felony suspects in legislation – the Prisoners‟ Counsel Act 
1836. Substantial discussions of the history of this statute have been undertaken in the past, 
most notably by Cairns and Beattie,65 but a brief overview helps underline its significance. The 
„irksome and unfair‟66 restrictions placed on defence lawyers in the eighteenth century became 
the subject of substantial criticism in the early 1800s. By the 1820s, Parliamentarians had 
weighed in; between 1821 and 1836, a staggering ten attempts were made to pass legislation 
granting suspected felons full representation by a defence lawyer.67 Stifled by a conservative 
parliamentary make-up, proposed Bills (introduced primarily by reformer John Martin) were 
consistently rejected in the 1820s.  
 
However, by the next decade the balance of power in the House of Commons had shifted and 
the Bills, introduced by William Ewart, gained approval. After being delayed in the House of 
Lords, the inevitable victory for the reformers came with the passing of the final statute in 1836. 
It granted all felony suspects the right to „make full Answer and Defence thereto, by Counsel 
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learned in the Law‟, including the right of the defence lawyer to directly address the jury and to 
inspect depositions. The statute represented the first, formal recognition of the right of the 
majority to not only a defence counsel but an effective defence counsel. The expansion of the 
defence lawyer‟s remit from the cross-examination of witnesses to addressing the jury 
transformed the role, allowing defence lawyers to present and direct a case, offer observations 
and opinions, and actively „sway‟ the jury. The Prisoners‟ Counsel Act unshackled defence 
lawyers, enabling them to become true „zealous advocates‟ for the defendant. 
 
3 A Wider Debate 
Alongside this landmark statutory recognition of the cruciality of criminal defence, normative 
conceptions of the role of „zealous advocate‟ were becoming well developed. The criminal trial 
had become much more than „an opportunity for defense counsel to test the prosecution 
case‟;68 it was an arena for vigorous and steadfast defence advocacy on behalf of the accused. 
However, it is arguable that the concept of the „zealous advocate‟ had only partly evolved. As 
the criticisms of Brougham's philosophy indicate, obligations to justice and morality were 
emerging alongside those owed to the client. The American case of Rush v Cavanaugh69 is 
helpful in understanding early developments in the professional responsibility of defence 
lawyers.70 In this case, the attorney, Rush, prosecuted a third party for forgery on behalf of 
Cavanaugh; however, at an early point, Rush concluded that Cavanaugh's accusations were 
false and consequently withdrew the forgery charge. Cavanaugh branded his lawyer a „cheat‟ 
and Rush commenced slander proceedings against his former client. 
 
At the crux of Rush v Cavanaugh was the issue of whether the latter was justified in calling the 
former a „cheat‟, a matter which hinged upon how well Rush had fulfilled his role as a 
prosecutor. Although the case applies most directly to prosecutors, Pennsylvanian Chief Justice 
John Gibson's words have application to the legal profession generally. He suggested that „it is 
a popular, but gross mistake, to suppose that a lawyer owes no fidelity to anyone except his 
client; and that the latter is the keeper of his professional conscience.‟ Gibson described the 
lawyer as being „expressly bound by his official oath to behave himself in his office of attorney 
with all due fidelity to the court as well as the client‟, suggesting an equal, if not paramount, duty. 
He went further, implying that lawyers must discharge their duties in accordance with acceptable 
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standards of morality and empathy, explaining: The high and honourable office of a counsel 
would be degraded to that of a mercenary, were he compelled to do the biddings of his client 
against the dictates of his conscience.‟71 
 
The introduction of such language into descriptions of the lawyer's role was influential, 
particularly in application to criminal defence lawyers. George Sharswood borrowed the above 
quotations from Rush v Cavanaugh in discussing the importance of morality in the advocate's 
role. In his 1860 work, An Essay on Professional Ethics, Sharswood suggested that it was:72 
An immoral act to afford… assistance, when [the lawyer's] conscience told him that the 
client was aiming to perpetrate a wrong through the means of some advantage the law 
may have afforded him.73 
 
Instead, a lawyer should „throw up the cause, and retire from all connection with it, rather than 
thus be a participator in other men's sins.‟74 In referring specifically to „the mode of conducting 
defence‟, he stated: 
Counsel… may and even ought to refuse to act under instructions from a client to defeat 
what he believes to be an honest and just claim, by insisting upon the slips of the 
opposite party, by sharp practice, or special pleading – in short, by any other means than 
a fair trial on the merits in open court.75 
 
Although respectful of Brougham's defence of Queen Caroline, Sharswood believed that he was 
„led by the excitement of so great an occasion to say what cool reflection and sober reason 
certainly never can approve.‟76 That being said, Sharswood recognised the importance of the 
defence lawyer's role as a partisan for the defendant. He stated that „the great duty which the 
counsel owes to his client, is an immovable fidelity‟,77 and criticised the suggestion that 
vigorously defending the guilty was immoral: 
It is not to be termed screening the guilty from punishment, for the advocate to exert all 
his ability, learning, and ingenuity, in such a defence, even if he should be perfectly 
assured in his own mind of the actual guilt of the prisoner.78 
 
The publication of David Hoffman's „Fifty Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment 
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‟represented a landmark in the development of legal ethics generally.79.It described a collection 
of ideal principles that should guide the conduct of practitioners, several having particular 
relevance to criminal defence. Resolution I supported criticism of Brougham's philosophy, 
stating, „I will never permit zeal to carry me beyond the limits of sobriety and decorum‟. From the 
outset, Hoffman suggested that limits should apply to partisanship. Resolution II indicated that 
lawyers should remain emotionally detached in conducting their work, saying, „I will espouse no 
man's cause out of envy, hatred or malice, towards his antagonist.‟  Hoffman also asserted that 
a defence lawyer should refrain from exploiting the mistakes of opponents, stating, „no man's 
ignorance or folly shall induce me to take any advantage of him‟ (Resolution V). Significantly, 
other rules suggested duties of honesty, truthfulness and justice which seemingly outranked the 
obligation to defend a client 'at all hazards and costs', as Brougham termed it: 
Should my client be disposed to insist on captious requisitions, or frivolous and 
vexatious defences, they shall be neither enforced nor countenanced by me. (Resolution 
X) 
 
If, after duly examining a case, I am persuaded that my client's claim or defence… 
cannot, or rather ought not, to be sustained, I will promptly advise him to abandon it. To 
press it further in such a case… would be lending myself to a dishonourable use of legal 
means.(Resolution XI) 
 
More compelling still was Resolution XV, addressing the morality of defending „persons of 
atrocious character, who have violated the laws of God and man‟: 
When employed to defend those charged with crimes of the deepest dye, and the 
evidence against them, whether legal or moral, be such as to leave no just doubt of their 
guilt, I shall not hold myself privileged, much less obliged, to use my endeavours to 
arrest or to impede the course of justice, by special resorts to ingenuity – the artifices of 
eloquence – to appeals to the morbid and fleeting sympathies of weak juries.80 
 
This arguably stands in contrast to that of single-minded partisanship, even suggesting that 
testing a prosecution is unacceptable where the client is undeserving of „special exertions from 
any member of our pure and honourable profession‟.81  
 
Indeed, Hoffman fairly explicitly undermined the concept of detachment, claiming: 
Counsel, in giving opinions, whether they perceive this weakness in their clients or not, 
should act as judges, responsible to God and to man, as also especially to their 
employers, to advise them soberly, discreetly, and honestly, to the best of their ability – 
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though the certain consequence be the loss of large prospective gains.(Resolution XXXI) 
 
However, Hoffman also affirms the ethic of Brougham to some extent, stating, „to my clients I will 
be faithful; and in their causes, zealous and industrious‟ (Resolution XVIII). Although an 
important theoretical milestone, these resolutions were not „didactic rules‟ binding 
practitioners;82 caution should be exercised in relying on Hoffman‟s sometimes self-contradictory 
and, occasionally, extreme conceptualisation of the advocate‟s role. 
 
4 The Moral Advocate 
Hoffman and Sharswood started a debate that continues to divide academic opinion today: „the 
question as to the duties of an advocate in foro conscientiae – his ethical as distinguished from 
his forensic duty, and whether the two are reconcilable or mutually exclusive.‟83 The criminal 
defender's duties in foro conscientiae ('before the tribunal of conscience') potentially conflict with 
his or her obligations not only to zealously defend a client but to even represent them; which of 
these obligations prevails was subject to vociferous academic argument throughout the 
nineteenth century. Both sides of the conflict were well-documented in Showell Rogers' 1899 
article, The Ethics of Advocacy. Several commentators quoted in his article argued that it was 
not the place of the defence lawyer to engage in moral judgment of a client or cause. For 
example, Sir Harry Bodkin Poland QC stated that a defence lawyer should endeavour „to get an 
acquittal if he can, whatever the merits of the case may be‟, while Sydney Smith claimed: „that, 
the decided duty of an advocate [is] to use all the arguments in his power to defend the cause 
he has adopted, and to leave the effects of those arguments to the judgment of others.‟84 
 
Others contended that detachment and partisanship could not be allowed to rule defence 
advocacy unchallenged by moral standards of righteousness, fairness, truth and justice. In a 
direct response to a speech by Brougham at a banquet for the English Bar, Sir Alexander 
Cockburn (the Lord Chief Justice in 1864) described that the role of the advocate was to „seek 
to reconcile the interests he is bound to maintain… with the eternal and immutable interests of 
truth and justice.‟85 
 
Rogers himself also identified moral limitations on defence advocacy. He claimed that „every 
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advocate is bound by an unwritten but stringent bond of ethical obligation to take no undue 
advantage of his tribunal‟ and that „courts… are not to be misled nor inveigled into wrong 
judgments by the misplaced ingenuity of advocates in order to gain victories for their clients in 
particular cases.‟86 Rogers believed that were such advocacy to prevail, then „truth would be 
dishonoured and justice dethroned‟.87 He urged defenders to remember that „the stream of his 
forensic eloquence should flow from him as through a purifying filter ‟, adding that „it behoves 
him to guard against opening the sluices of words regardless of evil consequences to others 
than his client‟.88 However, Rogers also accepted that sometimes „the suppressio veri 
(concealment of the truth) may not only be well within the legal and moral rights of an advocate, 
it may even constitute his actual duty‟ and that a defence lawyer „has no monopoly in truth-
seeking and no certainty that he will arrive unaided at a just conclusion as to the law‟.89 Even 
renowned philosophers weighed in on the debate. When asked whether one should defend a 
bad cause, Samuel Johnson famously argued that „you do not know it to be bad or good until 
the judge determines it‟;90 in contrast, Jeremy Bentham described the defence lawyer who 
protects a client who has confessed guilt as „an accessory after the fact‟.91 
 
Notwithstanding the spirited debate about its place in adversarial advocacy, morality has been 
notably absent as a formal duty incumbent on criminal defence lawyers. The last century has 
been dominated by arguments about the extent of the lawyer‟s obligation to provide the accused 
with a „full defence‟: for example, what questions and tactics can he or she employ, and what 
secrets can he or she hide. These debates have primarily taken place in the context of 
balancing due process and equality of arms with procedural integrity and truth-seeking 
functions. Questions addressing whether the defence lawyer behaves in a morally 
commendable manner in undertaking his or her duties have been side-lined to some extent. 
One could argue quite confidently that the philosophy of Brougham – which encouraged an 
advocate to go so far as to plunge his nation into political and social turmoil to succeed – did 
much to push the debate in a due process-oriented direction, and anointed the „full defence‟ 
principle as the most important strand of criminal defence ethics up for discussion. As is made 
clear earlier in this article, the importance of the „full defence‟ principle clearly emerged in 
reaction to the substantial flaws evident in the criminal justice system: the systematic abuse and 
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repression of the rights of prisoners, the one-sided nature of criminal trials in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries; the exploitation of prosecution for profit by thief-takers and solicitors; 
and the myth popularised by Serjeant William Hawkins that „it requires no manner of skill to 
make a plain and honest defence‟.92 All were questioned, and it appeared that a „full defence‟ 
was required to remedy these issues.  
 
In the twentieth century, the notions of pluralism and equality have further undermined the 
desirability of „moral advocacy‟ in the criminal justice system. In any society, there will be people 
considered to be outcasts or undesirables, those who do not conform to the political, religious or 
moral expectations of their communities. However, in a pluralist society, deviation from the norm 
is tolerated; where this deviation strays beyond reasonable boundaries, most notably when a 
law is broken, it is regulated via the mechanism of the legal system. Adversarial culture 
recognises that „we do not order our communities by direct appeal to any particular view of the 
good‟. As a result, the determination of legal issues is based on „decision procedures structured 
to take all reasonable views seriously.‟93 
 
All citizens, accused of any offence, should be able to defend themselves before an 
independent and objective tribunal. Of course, anyone can do this in theory (as Serjeant 
Hawkins suggested), but the practical complexity of the legal system means that the vast 
majority of people require the help of a skilled professional to do so; as such, criminal defence 
lawyers are effectively the 'key' to accessing legal rights, granting them „tremendous power‟94 in 
deciding who to represent and how much effort to expend on their behalf. The fact is that the 
majority of suspects and defendants would probably be considered 'deviant', usually because of 
a past criminal record, poverty, social habits, ethnicity, and other factors. Equally, many 
offences, particularly the most serious like rape and murder, are considered heinous by most 
people.   
 
The argument against a „moral advocate‟ suggests that if a criminal defence lawyer was 
permitted to refuse to represent someone or provide a less vigorous service for a defendant on 
the basis of personal morality, then not only would many people be denied access to the law, 
but the designated system for determining criminal justice issues would be circumvented. 
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Furthermore, it is argued that individual lawyers simply cannot be trusted to impose their own 
personal morality on others for fear of creating an „oligarchy‟.95 Even if defence lawyers were 
willing to become moral crusaders, one might argue that concepts such as „common morality‟ or 
„the greater good‟ are nebulous, vague and subjective – all words antipathetic to legal culture. 
However, the direction of debate appears to have shifted in recent years; as Alice Woolley 
pointed out in 1996, „the dominant tone of current scholarship… [is] highly critical of lawyers‟ 
seeming ability to remove their 'professional' actions from the scrutiny of basic precepts of 
ordinary morality‟. Additionally, there has been a significant push by successive governments 
since the election of New Labour to put victims of crime at the „centre‟ of the criminal justice 
system, on the grounds that many are treated in an unethical and immoral manner during 
criminal trials. Various limitations (or obstacles dependent on one‟s view) have been imposed on 
the defence lawyer and his or her ability to question victims in a manner advantageous to the 
defendant. This article does not provide significant detail about these victim-oriented changes, 
but it would be fair to say that the nineteenth century debate about defence lawyers and morality 
is likely to have increased relevance in the years to come. 
 
Defending the Guilty 
The balancing act required of defence lawyers was, and still is, embodied in ethical conflict. This 
is well exemplified by the situation where a defendant confesses guilt to the defence lawyer, but 
insists on a defence anyway; this pits the duty to be a zealous advocate for a client against the 
obligation of amicus curiae and truth-seeker, and has been described as the „supreme test 
problem‟ in legal ethics.96 In an arguable milestone in the historical development of the role, the 
„supreme test problem‟ was addressed in court in the middle of the nineteenth century in the 
infamous Courvoisier Case. In 1840, François Courvoisier – a Swiss valet – was tried for the 
murder of his master, Lord William Russell. Courvoisier pleaded not guilty and his lawyer, the 
venerable barrister Charles Phillips, pursued a vigorous defence. The prosecution‟s case was 
undermined by a poor police investigation and Phillips took full advantage of this; however, part 
way through the trial, the defendant confessed his guilt to Phillips – in the light of newly 
discovered and fairly conclusive evidence – but insisted that Phillips continue to defend him. 
The defence lawyer was faced with the „supreme test problem‟, and approached the Bench for 
advice. Phillips was asked by the bench whether Courvoisier still wanted his advocacy; Phillips 
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confirmed that the defendant did, and was advised by the Bench that he was „bound to do so‟ 
and was „to use all fair arguments arising out of the evidence‟ to further Courvoisier‟s defence.97 
 
Phillips proceeded to present a robust and aggressive defence for Courvoisier, who was 
eventually convicted and executed. On discovering the truth about Phillips‟ defence of 
Courvoisier, there was substantial public outcry, unprecedented media coverage, and extensive 
debate and commentary about legal ethics amongst politicians, academics and even writers like 
Charles Dickens. Despite the criticism levelled at Phillips, the case set out a very clear principle 
– the defendant is entitled to a full and fair defence, on the evidence, regardless of a confession 
of guilt to the advocate. The „Courvoisier Principle‟ is followed to this day in the courts of 
England and Wales, and beyond. As such, the case substantially supports the principles of 
zealous advocacy, detachment and confidentiality whilst simultaneously casting doubt on the 
practical importance of morality and truth-seeking in the criminal defence profession. 
 
The nineteenth century was revolutionary in terms of the rights granted to suspects and 
defendants, and the freedoms afforded to defence lawyers to protect them. To cap off a 
remarkable 100 years, the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 entitled the defendant to be a witness in 
his or her own trial. Section 1 of the statute established that „every person charged with an 
offence… shall be a competent witness for the defence at every stage of the proceedings‟. 
Furthermore, this right was only exercisable „upon his own application‟; no defendant could be 
compelled to appear as a witness, protecting the class of accused with a tendency to unwittingly 
incriminate themselves through poor testimony. This right expanded the role of the defence 
lawyer significantly. It finally allowed the lawyer to conduct a defence on an equal basis with the 
prosecution, using the accused‟s own words as evidence and enabling the advocate to carefully 
shepherd his or her client through testimony. The statute fully enfranchised the defence lawyer 
defined by partisanship and client-oriented obligations. 
 
Conclusion 
The core duties and obligations which continue to delineate the role of the criminal defence 
lawyer in the twenty-first century were forged through a fascinating evolutionary process. This 
involved the lobbying for and passage of statutes, the determination of outstanding practitioners, 
the gradual re-shaping of the common law, and extensive debate and discussion amongst 
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academics, philosophers, professionals and politicians. The principles outlined in the „zealous 
advocate‟ model – partisanship, detachment, confidentiality, procedural justice, truth-seeking 
and morality – were undoubtedly the product of a long and difficult self-examination of how 
justice should be conducted in this jurisdiction by the people involved in administering it and 
those observing it. Moreover, the development of the criminal defence lawyer as a crucial entity 
within the criminal justice system arguably spearheaded the birth of a raft of rights we now 
consider central to any liberal democracy. As the defence lawyer emerged as a powerful force, 
the foundations of a core Human Right were laid – the right to a fair trial and its corollaries of 
equality of arms, the right to legal representation, the presumption of innocence and the right to 
silence at trial.  
 
Furthermore, the development of the defence lawyer‟s role gradually helped ensure that the 
prosecution burden of proof was properly discharged, that the laws of evidence (still in their 
infancy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries) were upheld, and that the judge – for so long 
merely a symbol of neutrality – finally adopted the role of impartial arbiter, rather than principal 
investigator. Above all, the rise of the defence lawyer occurred alongside some of the most 
important developments in English and Welsh criminal justice – the emergence and 
entrenchment of adversarial culture and the professionalization of the criminal justice system. 
Therefore, the historical development of the defence lawyer is also a story about the birth of the 
modern criminal justice system in this jurisdiction and those it is influenced by. This article has 
only scratched the surface – it is my intention to conduct much more research into this 
extraordinary figurehead of adversarialism and my hope that others will also seek to do so. 
